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It is often thought that the existence of other worlds cannot be scientifically verified and there-
fore should be treated as philosophical speculation. In this article, I describe several methods for
determining if other worlds exist, even without interacting with them. These methods are based on
the following premise: if there are many worlds, then the statistical properties of a natural process
are biased when measured by an observer whose existence was influenced by the process. The bias
is always in the same direction, making the process appear more beneficial for the existence of the
observer than it actually is. I suggest several potential ways of measuring the bias, show through
a simple model of population dynamics how the bias is generated, and briefly consider whether our
current drop in population growth is evidence of many worlds.
PACS numbers:
INTRODUCTION
Several well-known theories in physics posit that the
universe is extremely large, containing a vast number of
causally disconnected regions or “worlds”[1–6]. Suppose
these theories are correct and there are many worlds.
How could we possibly know they exist? In this article, I
show that if there are many worlds, then the environment
of a typical observer will be biased – it will appear more
beneficial for their existence than it should be. Assuming
we are typical observers, the presence of such bias in our
own environment is evidence of many worlds.
The results I present are based on a modified and more
complete version of the anthropic principle:
When interpreting data, you must account
for the fact that your location in the universe
is necessarily privileged: First, you will only
find yourself in a location where it is possible
that you exist. Second, you are more likely
to find yourself in a location where it is more
probable that you exist.
Both statements are truisms.
The first truism is simply a rephrasing of Carter’s an-
thropic principle[7–9]. It serves as a useful reminder that
your surroundings have been subject to a selection ef-
fect: out of the entire universe, your location has been
“selected” to be compatible with your existence. In prac-
tice, this means you should not simply assume you live in
a typical region of the universe. It could be that you live
in an atypical or “surprising” region because a typical
region is incompatible with you.
The second truism is new in the sense that it has never
been formally stated. It accounts for the second form
of “privilege” endowed to your location – you are more
likely to find yourself in a location where it is more prob-
able that you exist. It serves as a useful reminder that
if you believe certain locations are more conducive for
your existence than others, you must account for this
when interpreting data. In practice, this means that even
among those regions of the universe that are compatible
with your existence, you should not assume your region
is typical. It could be that some compatible regions are
more conducive for your existence (i.e., are “biased” to-
wards you), and you are more likely to find yourself in
one of these regions simply because they are more likely
to produce you.
The truisms are just that – they are true by construc-
tion. They do not attempt to formalize how to determine
which locations in the universe are compatible with your
existence nor how you should determine the likelihood
of your existence across these locations. Instead, they
are important reminders that if you believe certain re-
gions are more likely to produce you than others, then
you must account for this when interpreting data.1
In this article, I am interested in using anthropic rea-
soning to determine if many worlds exist. To derive re-
sults, I will add an assumption to the second truism that
is accepted by nearly all physicists and philosophers who
have written on the topic[10–29], but that could be in-
correct (see [30, 31]) – I will assume that you are more
likely to exist at locations in the universe where many
observers like you have been generated. Specifically, I
will assume that the likelihood of your existence at one
location vs. another is in direct proportion to the ratio
of suitable observers existing at those locations.
There are several ways to motivate this assumption.
1 Eddington was perhaps the first physicist to make use of the
complete version of the anthropic principle when he stated, “It
is practically certain that a universe containing mathematical
physicists will at any assigned date be in the state of maximum
disorganization which is not inconsistent with the existence of
such creatures.”[10] He was using anthropic reasoning to point
out a deep problem with Boltzmann’s hypothesis that our region
of the universe is a thermal fluctuation – if true, then we are
much more likely to exist within a small and brief fluctuation
than within a large fluctuation the size of our world.
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2One such way is through an appeal to typicality across a
suitable reference class of observers, or to what has been
called the principle of mediocrity[12, 24]. Without evi-
dence to the contrary, you should assume you are typical
within each reference class to which you belong – as if
you were randomly selected from all individuals within
that reference class.2 If you are a random selection across
suitable observers, then the likelihood that you exist at
one location vs. another is in direct proportion to the
ratio of suitable observers at those locations.
Another, perhaps more natural, way to motivate the
assumption is to treat your existence as the result of an
experiment by the universe. At various locations, the uni-
verse has generated intelligent observers, each of which
had a certain prior potential of being you. If we assume
each generated observer had equal potential of being you,
then the likelihood that you exist at one location vs. an-
other is in direct proportion to the ratio of observers at
those locations.3
Throughout the article, I will use the term “the uni-
verse” to refer to the set of all things that have existed
or that will ever exist (including all of space-time), the
term “small universe” to represent that the universe is
limited in size and age so that it does not extend far
beyond its current observable edge and will not last for-
ever, and the term “large universe” to represent that the
universe is extremely large (perhaps infinitely large) and
contains many other disconnected worlds, either via in-
finite space-time, separate inflationary events, quantum
branching, and/or some other mechanism.
As I show below, if the universe is large, then you
will typically find yourself at a location that is atypi-
cally suited for you, i.e., at a location that appears un-
usually biased towards your existence. This bias is all-
encompassing, influencing all processes that affect the
probability of your existence. For example, you are
likely to observe a higher than baseline rate of popu-
lation growth in the past, a lower than baseline rate
of catastrophic risk[18, 26], physical constants that are
2 A similar assumption, called the Self-Sampling Assumption
(SSA), exists in philosophy and is motivated using thought
experiments[15]. There is also the Self-Indication Assumption
(SIA) in philosophy, which extends a reference class from ex-
isting individuals within that class to all individuals within the
class, whether they exist or not[15]. Under either the SSA or
SIA, the assumption I make holds true – that the likelihood of
your existence at one location vs. another is in direct proportion
to the ratio of suitable observers existing at those locations.
3 Note that a particularly useful consequence of this reasoning is
that you can assume different potentials across observers (for
example, you may think that an alien or a monkey is much less
likely to have the necessary brain structure required to be you).
In this case, you can appropriately do anthropic reasoning by
weighting observers according to these different potentials, which
is something that cannot be done when using reference classes
(see footnote 6 in [28]).
not only compatible but especially conducive for galaxy
formation[12, 21, 22, 32], and an evolutionary history
that appears unnaturally guided to your existence.
The anthropic principle has been used in other pa-
pers to argue for a “multiverse”[33–35]. These papers
note that our location in the universe seems fine-tuned
to our existence, i.e., out of the set of possible worlds with
our physical laws, only a miniscule fraction have physi-
cal constants that are compatible with the development
of life[11, 36, 37]. That we exist, therefore, is evidence
that the universe has sampled from the space of possible
worlds many times, and therefore must be quite large.
I will discuss this argument and develop a more general
version of it below.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. I first
consider whether your existence itself is evidence of a
large universe. I then show that if the universe is large,
you will typically exist at a different location than if the
universe is small. Finally, as a proof of concept, I model
population dynamics and show that a typical observer in
a universe of many worlds will observe a strong bias in
population growth that is removed after they exist, but
a typical observer in a universe of one world will not.
SHOULD YOU EXIST?
The simplest argument for a large universe is that it
makes your existence certain, whereas otherwise it might
be an extremely surprising result. Suppose that you are
unlikely to exist if the universe is small but that you
are certain to exist if the universe is large. Your current
existence, therefore, is evidence that the universe is large.
More formally, assume P (E|S)  1 and P (E|L) = 1,
where E denotes that you exist, S denotes that the uni-
verse is small, and L denotes that the universe is large.
Assuming your prior for a large universe is not infinites-
imal, then after considering that you exist, the posterior
odds of a large universe are,
P (L|E)
P (S|E) =
P (E|L)P (L)
P (E|S)(1− P (L))  1, (1)
and you should believe with almost certainty that the
universe is large.
The above argument depends critically on whether or
not your existence is rare in a small universe. It also
requires that you treat your existence as a pre-determined
possible outcome, i.e., as if you were a specific lottery
ticket that may or may not be drawn by the universe.
Notice, however, that the argument is very general.
It works regardless of the reason why your existence is
rare. For example, and as previously mentioned, you
may think that a small universe is extremely unlikely to
contain a world with the correct physical constants nec-
essary for your existence. Alternatively, you may think
3that in a small universe, life cannot evolve under the time
constraints imposed by stellar life cycles.
Even if you believe it likely that people exist in a small
universe, you can still be convinced that the universe is
large if you believe it unlikely that you were produced
by the universe. For example, you might think that the
number of possible people is astronomically large and
that a small universe surely could not sample from this
space enough times to make it likely that you exist. Such
an argument requires only the assumption that the space
of distinct possible people is very large, and it works even
if the universe was designed specifically for intelligent life.
WHERE SHOULD YOU BE LOCATED?
Suppose you think your existence is certain, even in
a small universe, so that the previous argument is not
compelling. In this case, there are other ways to find
evidence that the universe is large. Here, I assume you
exist and show if the universe is large, you will typically
exist in a different location than if the universe is small.
Therefore, in principle, you should be able to determine
whether or not the universe is large by carefully observing
your surroundings.
Consider the following toy cosmological model with
two types of worlds[38–40],
World W1: 1 million observers, P(W1) = 0.999
World W2: 1 trillion observers, P(W2) = 0.001
If the universe is small and draws only one world, then
with 99.9% probability it will draw a world of type W1,
and you will exist there. However, if the universe is large
and draws both types of worlds many times, then you
are much more likely to exist in W2 than in W1. The
W2 worlds comprise only a tiny fraction of a large uni-
verse, but they are much more likely to produce you:
they sample from the space of observers 1 million times
more frequently than W1.
More formally, assume the set of all physically possible
worlds, Ω, is completely specified. Furthermore assume
the laws of physics are known and they determine the
probability measure P on Ω which represents the out-
come of nature selecting one of these worlds for existence.
The universe is the collection of worlds that exist, i.e.,
the set of possible worlds selected by nature. Denote by
Ω′ ⊆ Ω the subset of possible worlds where you exist, and
assume it is certain you exist, i.e.,
∑
ω∈Ω′ P(ω) = 1. Fi-
nally, denote by n(ω) the number of observers that exist
in possible world ω.
In a small universe, the world in which you live is sim-
ply chosen according to the laws of nature. The proba-
bility that you find yourself in world ω is therefore,
PS(ω) = P(ω). (2)
In a large universe, many worlds exist. Assuming a
large universe has sampled many times from the set of
possible worlds and that you are a typical observer across
these worlds[20, 24], then the probability that you find
yourself in world ω is,
PL(ω) =
n(ω)P(ω)∑
ω∈Ω′ n(ω)P(ω)
. (3)
Notice that in general, PS(ω) 6= PL(ω), and you typi-
cally will find yourself in a different world depending on
whether or not the universe is large.
In a large universe, your location is biased towards
worlds that are conducive for your existence. The bias
can be subtle. For example, if a certain medical dis-
covery allows your civilization to produce twice as many
observers, then you are twice as likely to exist in a world
where your civilization makes the discovery than in one
where it doesn’t. The bias can also be quite strong. It
can be strong enough such that you exist in a world that
is highly atypical – a world that you would not find your-
self in if the universe only consisted of one world.
Going back the original example and using Eqs. 2 and
3,
PS(ω ∈W1) = 0.999, (4)
PS(ω ∈W2) = 0.001, (5)
PL(ω ∈W1) ≈ 0.001, (6)
PL(ω ∈W2) ≈ 0.999. (7)
Notice that the probability of being in one or the other
type of world is reversed if the universe is small vs large,
and that your world type, therefore, can be used as con-
vincing evidence that the universe is small or large.
As previously mentioned, the above calculations as-
sume your existence is certain whether or not the uni-
verse is small or large. If it is unlikely you exist in a
small universe (perhaps because it is unlikely you exist
if only a small number of observers typically exist), then
the analysis leading to Eq. 2 would be different (see [14]
and [28]). However, if it is unlikely you exist in a small
universe, then your existence by itself should convince
you that the universe is large (see Section II), and you
should use Eq. 3 instead.
DETERMINING BIAS
Although it is relatively straightforward to demon-
strate that a typical observer in a large universe will exist
in a world biased towards their existence, it is perhaps
not as easy for an observer to determine that the bias ex-
ists. The observer would need a correct model of cosmol-
ogy, whereas often cosmological models are formulated
by extrapolating from an observer’s surroundings. For
example, in the above toy model, an observer in a large
4universe who exists in W2 might interpret their circum-
stance as evidence that a W2 world is typical rather than
as evidence that the universe is large.
There are several ways to overcome this problem and
establish that your world is biased. I describe four meth-
ods below. The first two methods search for evidence
of bias in processes that are inherently unobservable and
that you must posit exist, whereas the second two at-
tempt to measure bias in processes that are observable
or that you can collect direct evidence of.
(1) As previously mentioned, you might discover that
certain parameters in your world are finely-tuned to val-
ues that are compatible with your existence. Assuming
these parameters could have taken a number of different
values, finding that they are set within a narrow range
that allows your existence is compelling evidence of bias.
For example, physical constants and biological parame-
ters appear finely-tuned to our existence[8, 11, 36, 37]
(2) In addition to being compatible with your exis-
tence, you might find that parameters in your world are
tuned even further, to values that are especially con-
ducive for your existence. Again, assuming these param-
eters could have taken a number of different values, find-
ing that they are set within an extremely narrow range
predicted by Eq. 3 is even stronger evidence that your
world is biased. For example, the value of the cosmo-
logical constant in our world is more finely-tuned to our
existence than it needs to be and is in close proximity to
the value that maximizes Eq. 3[12, 21, 22, 32].
(3) There will be circumstances where a natural pro-
cess in your world has sometimes influenced the prob-
ability of your existence and othertimes where it has
not. Bias can be established by comparing the statis-
tical properties of the process across these two cases. For
example, many of the properties of earth that make it
especially conducive for life are statistical outliers when
compared to other planets[41, 42]. If a small universe is
unlikely to contain a planet as conducive for life as earth,
then earth’s existence is evidence that we live in a biased
world. Other potential examples include the following:
evolutionary processes that have lead to our existence
may exhibit different statistical properties than evolu-
tionary processes that have not, and catastrophic risks
(such as asteriod impacts) might occur much less fre-
quently than baseline values determined from instances
of these processes independent of our existence[26].
(4) After you exist, there is no reason for processes in
your world to remain biased towards your existence[18].
Therefore, in a large universe, a natural process that in-
fluences the probability of your existence will exhibit an
abrupt change in its statistical properties after you exist.
In general, the process will appear conducive for your ex-
istence before you exist and will not after you exist. Bias
is established by comparing the properties of the process
before and after you exist. Boltzmann’s fluctuation hy-
pothesis for our world and the resulting arrow of time in
thermodynamics is an example, albeit an incorrect one,
of this statistical break[43]. (Boltzmann’s hypothesis is
incorrect because, as pointed out by Eddington[10], the
statistical break should occur at the moment of our exis-
tence, i.e., as part of a localized “Boltzmann brain” fluc-
tuation, rather than at a much earlier moment in time.)
It is this fourth method for establishing bias that I
focus on below.
POPULATION DYNAMICS
Assume that a solitary civilization of observers exists in
all possible worlds. The number of observers in the first
generation of the civilization is N0, and the size of later
generations increases or decreases in an unbiased random
way that is fully accounted for across possible worlds.
Generations are indexed by t, where t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T .
The size of each generation, Nt, follows a random growth
process,
Nt+1 = ΛtNt, (8)
where the growth factor, Λt, is a random variable that is
equally likely to be λ or 1/λ. Note that the continuous
growth rate is zero on average,
〈rt,t+∆t〉 =
〈
log
(
Nt+∆t
Nt
)/
∆t
〉
= 0. (9)
Example
As an example, assume that N0 = 1 million, λ = 2,
and T = 2. There are 4 paths for the population to fol-
low and therefore 4 types of possible worlds to consider,
{W1,W2,W3,W4}, which correspond to the respective
population paths, {↑↑, ↑↓, ↓↑, ↓↓}. For λ and 1/λ to be
equiprobable, each type of world must be equiprobable,
P(ω ∈ Wi) = 1/4 for i = 1, . . . , 4. Therefore, the proba-
bility that an observer exists in the different worlds in a
small and large universe are (using Eqs. 2 and 3),
PS(Wi) =
1
4
= 0.25 for i = 1, . . . , 4, (10)
and,
PL(W1) = 7/15.25 ≈ 0.459, (11)
PL(W2) = 4/15.25 ≈ 0.262, (12)
PL(W3) = 2.5/15.25 ≈ 0.164, (13)
PL(W4) = 1.75/15.25 ≈ 0.115. (14)
We can also calculate the probability that an observer
exists at locations with specific properties. For example,
let the property x represent time periods that correspond
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FIG. 1: Diagram illustrating how an observer in a large universe typically will exist in a world biased towards their existence,
whereas an observer in a small universe typically will not. The possible worlds represent different paths of population growth
for a solitary civilization as modelled in the text. Parameters for the model are N0 = 1, T=20, and λ = 2.
to each generation, x ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The expected time-
period in which an observer lives is,
〈x〉S = 1, (15)
〈x〉L ≈ 1.15, (16)
where 〈·〉S and 〈·〉L are averages taken over PS and PL
respectively. Notice that in the above model, an observer
in a large universe is more likely to exist in worlds that
produce more observers (Eqs. 11-14) and is more likely
to exist in a later generation (Eq. 16).
In Fig. 1, I plot the set of possible population paths
for N0 = 1, T=20, and λ = 2, and I demonstrate how an
observer will typically find themselves in a biased world
if the universe is large. In a large universe, many worlds
(and many civilizations) exist, and a randomly selected
individual is much more likely to be drawn from a world
with a large population, i.e., in a world biased towards
their existence. Using the same parameters as in Fig. 1,
I show in Fig. 2 the probability that a randomly selected
individual exists at different locations in a small and large
universe, PS(x, y) and PL(x, y), where x is the genera-
tion of an observer and y is the logarithm of the size of
an observer’s generation. The expected generation size
through time (black line) and the average overall loca-
tion of an observer (asterisk) in both a small and large
universe are alse shown.
Notice that even in a small universe, the location of
an observer is biased. The bias exists only within each
world, towards locations that contain more observers
(note that the distribution is slightly skewed upwards to-
wards larger Nt in Fig. 2(a)). Because the bias in a small
universe is only within each world, it is not as strong as
the bias that exists in a large universe.
An observer who exists in a large universe can estab-
lish that their world is biased by comparing estimates of
the continuous growth rate of the population measured
before, r0,x, and after, rx,T , they exist. In expectation,
such an observer will measure the following,
〈r0,x〉L ≈ 0.416, (17)
〈rx,T 〉L = 0. (18)
Notice that the growth rate of the population is biased
before a typical observer exists, but reverts to its base-
line value after they exist. A similar effect exists in a
small universe, although the nature of the bias is differ-
ent (the bias is first positive and then negative), and is
less pronounced: 〈r0,x〉S ≈ 0.115 and 〈r0,x〉S ≈ −0.115
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FIG. 2: The probability of existing at location x = t and y = Log(Nt)) in (a) a small universe and (b) a large universe assuming
the population model described in the text with parameters N0 = 1, T=20, and λ = 2. The expected generation size through
time (black line) and the average overall location of an observer (asterisk) are alse shown. In the figures, 〈x〉S = 10, 〈y〉S = 1.25,〈x〉L = 16.2, 〈y〉L = 6.74.
Our Population
Although the above model of population dynamics is
quite crude, we can attempt to fit it to our own pop-
ulation for illustration. In Fig. 3(a) I plot estimates of
the logarithm of human birth rate (total births per year)
at 40,000 BC, 6500 BC, 1 AD, and 2010 AD. In addi-
tion, I show the expected generation size through time
(black line) and the standard deviation around this ex-
pectation (dotted black lines) for the population model
with parameters λ = 3.3, n0 = 1, and T = 20. To enforce
correspondence between the model and the data, the pa-
rameters of the model were chosen so that the expected
generation size of an observer in the model is equal to
our current birth rate (total births per year), and the
horizontal axis is normalized so that the year 2010 corre-
sponds to the expected generation of an observer in the
model.
In Fig. 3(b) and (c) I show estimates and projections of
birth rates from 1650 to 2100 and fertility rates from 1950
through 2100 based on United Nations data. Birth rates
increased rather quickly during the industrial revolution,
but this growth abruptly stopped over the last 50 years.
Notice that our circumstance is consistent with that of
a typical observer whose population is naturally steady
through time and who lives in a large universe. Such
an observer would measure positive population growth
in the past which is removed at the time of their birth.
Of course, it is difficult to consider this consistency as
strong evidence of many worlds. It could be that our
population growth and subsequent halt is a typical path
for a civilization like ours, or alternatively, that an ex-
tremely large number of civilizations exist in a small uni-
verse (which would produce the same effect). On the
other hand, the correspondence between the model and
our circumstance should not be dismissed. We do not
have evidence that other civilizations in our world exist
and it is not at all clear that our population dynamics
have been typical (for instance, consider that HIV could
have spread to humans at any point in our history).
CONCLUSIONS
Anthropic reasoning has been used in cosmology for
many years[10], long before it was codified by Carter in
1974[7]. It helps us decide on theories: theories that are
incompatible with our existence cannot be valid and we
should exclude them. In addition, we should discount
theories that do not make our circumstance typical, and
the “complete anthropic principle” presented here now
makes this clear.
Carter was quick to point out that the anthropic prin-
ciple applies beyond cosmology and constrains theories
in biology as well[8]. Likewise, the complete anthropic
principle has implications outside of cosmology. If the
universe is large, then the typical circumstance of an ob-
server will likely be atypical according to the laws of na-
ture, and all disciplines must be aware of and correct for
this bias.
The atypical situation of a typical observer also has im-
portant implications for how science operates. Usually
when considering a theory, scientists start from initial
conditions and move forward along typically produced
paths. If there are many worlds, then this paradigm is
incorrect. Instead of finding ourselves in a typical world
according to the laws of nature (Eq. 2), each one of us
should find ourselves living in a world that made our ex-
istence extremely likely (Eq. 3). Scientific explanation,
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FIG. 3: (a) Human births per year (blue triangles) compared to the population model described in the text with parameters
N0 = 1, T=20, and λ = 3.3. The expected generation size through time (black line), the standard deviation around this
expectation (black dashed line), and the average overall location of an observer (asterisk) in the model are shown. The
horizontal axis measures time and is in units of years (bottom) and periods of the model (top). (b) United Nations estimates
and projections of global fertility from 1950 through 2100. (c) United Nations estimates and projections of births per year from
1650 through 2100.
therefore must start with each of us separately, working
outward and searching for those worlds that typically
produce us rather than those worlds that are typically
produced.
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